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Hospital Shared Purchasing Agreements After
White & White, Inc. v. American Hospital Supply
Corp.
INTRODUCTION

White & White, Inc. v. American Hospital Supply Corp.' presented a federal district court in Michigan with the task of
determining whether a purchasing agreement between a supplier
of hospital goods and services and twenty-nine nonprofit hospitals violated the antitrust laws.' In a lengthy opinion, the court
analyzed each element of the challenged agreement and concluded that the agreement and its implementation violated sections 13 and 24 of the Sherman Act.5
White & White marks the first time a court has applied the
antitrust laws to shared purchasing agreements in the health

1. 540 F. Supp. 951 (W.D. Mich. 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82-1305 (6th Cir. May 3,
1982).
2. The federal antitrust laws are embodied in four statutes commonly known as: the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976); the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 41-58 (1976); the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976), which includes the RobinsonPatman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976). For a basic explanation of the functions of each of
these statutes as they apply to the health care industry, see M. THOMPSON, ANTITRUST AND

THE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER 1-23 (1979); Palmer, Antitrust Activities by the Federal Trade
Commission in the Health Field - An Address Before a Joint Meeting of the Health &
Welfare Committee and the Council on Antitrust and Trade Regulation of the FBA, 37
FED. B.J. 40 (1978); Proger & Wentz, Antitrust Primer,in ANTITRUST INTHE HEALTH CARE
FIELD 1-25 (P. Proger ed. 1977); Rosoff, Antitrust Laws and the Health Care Industry:
New Warriors into an Old Battle, 23 ST. Louis U.L.J. 446, 450-53 (1979).
3. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in relevant part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976).
4. Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding one million dollars if a corporation or if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Id. § 2.
5. 540 F. Supp. 951, 1013, 1026 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
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care field. It offers hospitals and other health care providers the
first specific judicial guidance on the legalities of such agreements under the antitrust laws. 6 In reaching its decision, the
White & White court applied a theory commonly used to analyze
anticompetitive behavior in antitrust tying cases7 to a nontying
situation. This new application of the "leverage theory",, may
prove valuable for courts confronting sophisticated marketing

6. In an effort to contain rising health care costs, hospitals in the 1970's began participating in a variety of shared service programs. See Brown, Multi-InstitutionalArrangements: Shared Services Gain Support, 52 HOSPITALS 131 (Apr. 1978); Ludlam & Christensen, MultihospitalArrangements and the Federal Antitrust Laws, in MULTIHOSPITAL
SYSTEMS: POLICY ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE 23, 25 (G. Bisbee, Jr. ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited
as Ludlam]; Taylor, Participationin Shared Programs Up Sharply, Survey Discloses, 51
HOSPITALS 192 (July 1977). Under a shared service program, a shared service organization performs one or more services for two or more hospitals. See Proger, Antitrust and
Shared Services, in ANTITRUST IN THE HEALTH CARE FIELD 169 (P. Proger ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Proger]. Shared services range from purchasing, accounting and financial
management to laboratory testing and ambulance and emergency transportation. Id. See
also Domanico & Leverette, Shared Project Studies, Revises Hospital Record Retention
Policies, 52 HOSPITALS 133 (May 1978); Parker & Wardell, MultihospitalSystems Form a
Cooperative for Sharing Services, 54 HOSPITALS 79 (June 1980); Thueson, Hospitals' Programs and Progress in Cost Containment Reported, 51 HOSPITALS 131 (Sept. 1977); and
Toomey & Bruun, Multihospital Systems Minimizes Management Costs Through Centralized FinancialOperations,52 HOSPITALS 109 (June 1978).
Shared service organizations receive some statutory exemption under the Internal
Revenue Code. Specifically, Cooperative Hospital Service Organizations are tax exempt
under § 501(e) of the Code if all recipient hospitals are tax exempt under § 501(c)(3). See
Goodrich, Recent Developments in the Hospital Shared-Service Organization Controversy, 60 NEB. L. R :v. 35 (1981); Proger, supra, at 171-73. For the most part, however,
shared services are competitive entities subject to antitrust regulation because of their
effect on interstate commerce. See Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 452
U.S. 378 (1981); Proger, supra, at 170. Thus, joint purchasing programs, the most popular
shared service, are especially vulnerable to antitrust challenges because of their substantial impact on interstate commerce. See infra note 17. See also Richards, From Lightbulbs
to CT Scanners, Group PurchasingIs Filling the Bill at a Lower Price, 56 HOSPITALS 81
(Jan. 1982).
Shared purchasing agreements can present a variety of antitrust problems because a
large volume of business, generated by a number of independent entities, is combined
and is then controlled by a small number of vendors. See Dolan, What Are the Antitrust
Implications of Shared Purchasingfor Hospitals, 53 HOSPITALS 76 (Oct. 1979); Proger,
supra, at 170-75; Wallace, Shared Services Hold Antitrust Risk, 12 MODERN HEALTHCARE
136 (July 1982). Possible antitrust violations include: (1) exclusive dealing in violation of
§ 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act, (2) group boycotts in violation of § 1 of
the Sherman Act, (3) tying arrangements in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3
of the Clayton Act, (4) a combination in restraint of trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, (5) an attempt to monopolize, conspiracy to monopolize, or monopolization in
violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, and (6) price discrimination in violation of § 2(a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act. White & White, 540 F. Supp. at 960.
7. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 66-68, 101-03.
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agreements which have been cleverly written to evade the antitrust laws.
This note will first explore the recent application of the antitrust laws to the health care field. It will then focus on the White
& White decision and examine the court's reasoning in the case.
Next, the way in which the White & White court and other federal courts have employed the leverage theory in nontying cases
will by analyzed. Finally, this note will present the guidelines
proposed in White & White which the health care industry
should follow when executing shared purchasing agreements.
BACKGROUND

Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits every contract, combination, or conspiracy that restrains trade.9 Section 2, which applies to individual conduct as well as joint action not covered by
section 1, makes it a crime to monopolize, attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire to monopolize. 10 The Clayton Act" supplements the Sherman Act by prohibiting specific conduct. Section 3 of the Clayton Act 2 reaches three restrictive methods of
distribution: (1) exclusive dealing arrangements, (2) tying agreements, and (3) requirements contracts. Until the late 1970's,
these statutes were rarely applied to the health care industry. 13
The health care field's first significant encounter with the
antitrust laws occurred in 1943 when the Supreme Court decided
in American Medical Association v. United States 14 that the
business of operating prepaid health care plans constitutes
5
"trade" and is consequently subject to antitrust scrutiny.' It

9.
10.

See supra note 3.
See supra note 4.

11.
12.

15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
Section 3 of the Clayton Act provides in relevant part:

It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract ... on the condition, agreement, ... that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods....
of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such
lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding
may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of commerce.
Id. § 14.
13. Ludlam, supra note 6, at 26.
14.

317 U.S. 519 (1943).

15. Id. at 528. See also Leibenluft & Pollard, Antitrust Scrutiny of the Health Professions: Developing a Framework for Assessing Private Restraints,34 VAND. L. REv. 927,
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was not until 1976, however, that the antitrust laws were held to
apply to the operation of hospitals. In Hospital Building Co. v.
Trustees of Rex Hospital,16 the Supreme Court unanimously
decided that hospital activities, such as out-of-state purchases of
medicines and supplies, can have a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce.17 Prior to Rex Hospital, hospitals had claimed
immunity from antitrust regulation because their operations
18
were local in nature and did not affect interstate commerce.

933 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Leibenluft]; Rosoff, supra note 2, at 453; Note, Restraints
of Trade: Sherman Anti-trust Act: Whether American Medical Association May Be Guilty
of Restraints:Exemptions of a Labor Dispute Under the Norris-LaGuardiaAct, 29 CORNELl, L.Q. 271 (1943).
16. 425 U.S. 738 (1976). In Rex Hospital, a corporation which operated a proprietary
hospital in Raleigh, N.C. sued Rex Hospital, a private tax exempt hospital also located in
Raleigh, two of Rex's officers, and a local health planning officer under §§ 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act. The complaint alleged that the defendants had conspired to block the relocation and expansion of plaintiffs hospital in order to enable Rex to monopolize the
business of providing health care services in the Raleigh area.
17. Id. at 744. The Supreme Court found that if the defendants had succeeded in
blocking the planned expansion, plaintiffs purchases of out-of-state medicines and supplies, as well as its revenues from out-of-state insurance companies, would be substantially reduced. The Court also noted that management fees to the plaintiffs out-of-state
parent corporation would be less if the expansion were blocked, and out-of-state financing
would not occur. This combination of factors was found to be sufficient to establish a
"substantial effect" on interstate commerce under the Sherman Act. See also Borsody,
The Antitrust Laws and the Health Care Industry, 12 AKRON L. REv. 417, 424 (1979);
Halper, Private Litigation,in ANTITRUST IN THE HEALTH CARE FIELD 148, 151-52 (P. Proger

ed. 1977); Ludlam, supra note 6, at 26; Rosoff, supra note 2, at 474; Walbolt & Pankau,
Antitrust, Public Health-CareInstitutions, and the Developing Law, 1980 ARIz. ST. L.J.
385, 388 [hereinafter cited as Walbolt]; Note, Antitrust and Health Planning Under the
1974 NHPRD Act, 7 J. CORP. L. 311, 324-26 (1982).
Other courts have granted jurisdiction under the Sherman Act's "substantial effect"
text in cases involving health care services. See, e.g., Feminist Women's Health Center v.
Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 539-41 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979) (payments from out-of-state patients and insurance companies as well as out-of-state purchases of supplies have substantial impact on interstate commerce); City of Fairfax v.
Fairfax Hosp. Ass'n, 562 F.2d 280, 283 (4th Cir. 1977) (Virginia hospitals furnished with
substantial supplies and revenues from sources outside Virginia); Ballard v. Blue Shield,
543 F.2d 1075, 1078 (4th Cir. 1976) (alleged reduction of chiropractors' business throughout state of Virginia may adversely affect interstate commerce); Contra Cardio-Medical
Assoc. v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 536 F. Supp. 1065, 1074-84 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (denial of
hospital staff privileges not found to have substantial effect on interstate commerce);
H-ahn v. Oregon Physicians Serv., 508 F. Supp. 970, 977 (D. Ore. 1981) (insubstantial
effect on interstate commerce where fewer than two percent of podiatrists' patients travel
across state lines); Grigg v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 1980-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,500
(E.D. Mich. 1980) (complaint contained conclusionary allegation that defendant's activities substantially and adversely affected interstate commerce without specifically alleging reduced purchases of out-of-state purchaser of supplies and equipment).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon State Med. Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 338 (1952) (sale of
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Although Rex Hospital held that hospital activities are not
immune from antitrust regulation, certain hospitals have been
granted limited immunity under the antitrust laws. In Abbott
Laboratoriesv. PortlandRetail DruggistsAssociation, Inc.,19 the
Supreme Court considered whether drug manufacturers, who
charged commercial pharmacies higher prices than they charged
nonprofit hospitals for identical drugs, were guilty of price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Anti-Discrimination
Act. 20 The defendants relied on the Nonprofit Institutions Act, 21
which exempts purchases by nonprofit hospitals of supplies "for
their own use" from application of the Robinson-Patman Act.
The Court acknowledged the exemption, but narrowly inter-

medical services within the state of Oregon by doctor-sponsored organizations was not
trade or commerce within the meaning of § 1 of the Sherman Act).
See also Proger, supra note 2, at 4-6, stating that health care providers have defended
against application of the antitrust laws on three grounds: (1) the learned professions are
not commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Act; (2) the practice of the learned
professions is local in nature; and (3) restrictive practices involved in the delivery of
health care services are state regulated. The learned professions defense was severely
limited by Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), in which the Court stated:
"The nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the
Sherman Act . . . nor is the public service aspect of professional practice controlling in
determining whether Section 1 includes professions." Id. at 787. The local in nature
argument fell with Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976). The
state action defense originated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (federal antitrust
laws held not to apply to activities compelled by state of California program for marketing raisins), and continues to be applied on a case by case basis. See, e.g., Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (state approved marketing practice for light bulbs
by private utility is not sufficient basis for implying federal antitrust immunity).
See generally Borsody, supra note 17, at 423, 435; Kennedy, Of Lawyers, Lightbulbs,
and Raisins: An Analysis of the State Action Doctrine Under the Antitrust Laws, 74 Nw.
U.L. REv. 31 (1979); Rosoff, supra note 2, at 454-75; Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust
Developments: Defining the Scope of Exemptions, Expanding Coverage, and Refining
the Rule of Reason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 265, 308 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Sullivan];
Tyler, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar: The Professions Are Subject to the Sherman Act,
41 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1976); Walbolt, supra note 17, at 392; Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited:
The State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 898
(1977); Note, The Antitrust Liability of Professional Associations After Goldfarb: Reformulating the Learned Professions Exemption in the Lower Courts, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1047.
19. 425 U.S. 1 (1976). See Halper, supra note 17, at 154; Proger & Wentz, supra note 2,
at 20; Note, The ProperScope of the Non-Profit InstitutionsExemption: Abbott Laboratories v. PortlandRetail Druggists Association, 31 Sw. L.J. 606 (1977).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976) provides in relevant part: "(a) It shall be unlawful for any
person engaged in commerce.... to discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality,. . . where the effect of such discrimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly .. "
21. Id. § 13c. See Proger & Wentz, supra note 2, at 20; Note, supra note 19; Note,
Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, 94 HARV. L REv. 802 (1981).
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preted the phrase "for their own use."2 2 Thus, nonprofit hospitals have been granted limited immunity from the antitrust
laws.
Notwithstanding the limited immunity recognized in Abbott,
blanket immunity for the health care field has so far been
denied. In National Gerimedical Hospital & Gerontology Center
v. Blue Cross, 23 the defendant argued that the National Health
24
Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 (NHPRDA)
impliedly repealed the antitrust laws in the health care field and
25
that its conduct was therefore exempt from antitrust scrutiny.
The Supreme Court carefully examined the structure and goals
of NHPRDA to determine if any conflict with the antitrust laws
existed. Applying well established principles of antitrust immunity, 26 the Court found no such conflict under the facts of

22. 425 U.S. 1, 10- 18. The Court defined "for their own use" to mean "what reasonably
may be regarded as use by the hospital in the sense that such use is a part of and
promotes the hospital's intended institutional operation in the care of persons who are its
patients." Id. at 14.
23. 452 U.S. 378 (1981). Accord Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 666 F.2d
1029 (6th Cir. 1981). See also Prebil, The Health PlanningProcess and FederalAntitrust
Statutes: Is There a Health Planning Exemption?, 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 291, 302 (1981);
Proger, Decision Suggests High Court Will Scrutinize Repeal of Antitrust Laws, 11 MODERN HEALTHCARE 92 (Aug. 1981); Rosdeitcher, Contemporary Issues in Health Care: Cost
Containment and Competition, 17 FORUM 690, 694-99 (1982); Note, supra note 17, at 32830; Note, Antitrust - Implied Repeal of the Antitrust Laws by the National Health
PlanningAct, 56 TUL. L. REV. 749 (1982).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k - 300t (1976). The purpose of this Act is "to facilitate the development of recommendations for a national health planning policy, to augment areawide
and State planning for health services, manpower, and facilities, and to authorize financial assistance for the development of resources to further that policy." Id. § 300k(b).
See also Prebil, supra note 23, at 291, 296-310; Note, The National Health Planningand
Resources Development Act and State Action: A Reappraisalof the Role of Private
Health Care Institutions, 57 B.U.L. REV. 511 (1977).
25. 452 U.S. at 382. National Gerimedical Hospital sued Blue Cross of Kansas City
and the national Blue Cross Association, challenging Blue Cross's refusal to accept the
hospital as a participating member in a Blue Cross health care reimbursement plan. Blue
Cross had refused to accept National Gerimedical because the hospital had failed to meet
a requirement of the Mid-America Health Systems Agency, a private, nonprofit corporation federally funded under the National Health Planning and Resources Development
Act of 1974 (NHPRDA). Id. at 381. Acknowledging that the NHPRDA made no reference
to the antitrust laws, Blue Cross argued that NHPRDA's planning structure created an
implied repeal of the antitrust laws in the health care field. Id. at 382.
26. The Court relied on United States v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, 422 U.S.
694, 719-20 (1975) ("Implied antitrust immunity is not favored, and can be justified only
by a convincing showing of clear repugnancy between the antitrust laws and the regulatory system."); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348 (1963)
("Immunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly implied."); Silver v. New York Stock
Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963) ("Repeal is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to
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2 7 The Court emphasized, however, that
National Gerimedical.
its holding did not foreclose future claims of antitrust immunity
by other parts of the health care industry in other factual
28
settings.
Since Rex Hospital was decided, antitrust suits in the health
care industry have proliferated.2 9 Even hospital staff members
have invoked the antitrust laws against their hospitals."' In a
recent Seventh Circuit case, for example, an anesthesiologist
sued under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act challenging an
exclusive dealing contract for the provision of anesthesia services at a hospital because the contract precluded the plaintiff
from practicing at the hospital. :" The Seventh Circuit struck the
district court's injunction enjoining enforcement of the contract,12
and remanded the case with instructions to determine whether
the exclusive contract promoted competition among the hospitals
and among anesthesiologists to obtain such contracts.:'
In White & White the antitrust laws were applied to yet

make the [subsequent law] work, and even then only to the minimum extent necessary.
This is the guiding principle to reconciliation of the two statutory schemes."). See also
United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) (where the Court stated "repeals by
implication are not favored"); Note, The Antitrust Immunity Doctrine and United States
v. National Association of Securities Dealers: Stepping on Otter Tail, 28 HASTING;S L.J.
387 (1976).
27. 452 U.S. at 391.
28. Id. at 393 n.18. In fact, the defendant in White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp.
Supply Corp., 540 F. Supp. 951 (W.D. Mich. 1982), argued that a Medicare regulation had
created an implied antitrust exemption for hospital purchasing groups and their vendors.
Id. at 978. The court found that the Medicare regulation at issue does not conflict with the
antitrust laws, nor does it exempt hospital purchasing groups or their vendors from
complying with the antitrust laws. Id. at 979.
29. See generally Borsody, supra note 17; Grad, The Antitrust Laws and Professional
Discipline in Medicine, 1978 DUKE L.J. 443; Halper, The Health Care Industry and the
Antitrust Laws: Collision Course?, 49 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 17 (1980); Leibenluft, supra
note 15; Rosoff, supra note 2; Walbolt, supra note 17; Weller, How Can Healthcare Professionals Avoid It? HEALTHCARE FIN. MANAGEMENT, Oct. 1982, at 26. Note, Application
of the Antitrust Laws to Anticompetitive Activities by Physicians, 30 RUTGERS L. REI.
991 (1977).
30. See M. THOMPSON, supra note 2, at 149; Bernstein, Staff Privileges and Antitrust
Laws, 56 HOSPITALS 76 (Sept. 1982); Foster, Exclusive Arrangements Between Hospitals
and Physicians:Antitrust's Next Frontierin Health?,26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 535 (1982); Stoll,
Concerted Refusals to Deal: The Hospital Staffing Committee's Liability, 1979 Aiz. ST.
L.J. 563; Walbolt, supra note 17, at 399; Note, Denial of Open Staff Privileges: An Antitrust Scrutiny, 26 Sr. Louis U.L.J. 751 (1982); Note, Hospital Medical Staff: When are
Privilege Denials Judicially Reviewable?, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 95 (1977).
31. Dos Santos v. Columbia-Cuneo-Cabrini Med. Ctr., 684 F.2d 1346 (7th Cir. 1982).
32. Id. at 1350.
33. Id. at 1354-55.
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another factual context, namely, the anticompetitive aspects of a
shared purchasing agreement among hospitals.
WHITE & WHITE, INC. v. AMERICAN HOSPITAL SUPPLY CORP.

The Facts
In 1979, American Hospital Supply Corporation (AHSC), the
largest manufacturer and distributor of hospital supplies in
America, 34 and a group of hospitals, shareholders of Voluntary
Hospitals of America (VHA), 3 5 entered into a purchasing agreement whereby AHSC would sell a high volume and wide range
of products to VHA hospitals. 36 In return, VHA hospitals would
be eligible for volume discounts, price protection, and certain
37
other vendor services.
Unlike traditional group purchasing contracts, the AHSCVHA agreement provided that the VHA hospitals were not
required to purchase any AHSC product or service, nor was
AHSC required to sell to the hospitals at any stated group
price. 3 8 Instead, the product and terms of each sale were to be
39
negotiated between the individual VHA hospitals and AHSC.
The hospitals would become eligible for price caps and volume
discounts if, as a group, they reached certain fixed purchase
levels4 0 Hospitals purchased at a floating price until price caps

34. AHSC is located in Evanston, Illinois. It is the world's largest supplier of health
care products, manufacturing and distributing over 120,000 products and services. AHSC
services over 7,000 hospital customers from a national network of warehouses. In 1978,
the year before White & White was filed, AHSC reported net sales of $1,741,709,000. 540
F. Supp. 951,963 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
AHSC's 1981 Annual Report lists net sales as $2,870,100,000, a 17% increase over 1980.
For more insight into AHSC's financial strength, see Pillsbury, The Hard-Selling Supplier to the Sick, 106 FoRTUNE 56 (July 1982).
35. VHA is an Illinois corporation, headquartered in Troy, Michigan. VHA, a forprofit corporation, was founded in 1977 to provide its shareholders, 29 nonprofit hospitals
located in 22 states, with management services, research and development, cost contain:
ment systems, and economies of scale. The AHSC-VHA purchasing agreement listed the
smallest VHA shareholder as a 225-bed hospital, while the largest was a 1,821-bed hospital. 540 F. Supp. at 963-64.
36. Id. at 960.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 972.
39. Id.
40. Id. Volume discounts were earned if, during the year, the hospitals collectively
purchased $2,000 per bed. Once the $2,000 mark was reached, discounts increased as the
hospital group's average per-bed purchases increased.
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and volume discounts were earned and calculated. 41 The ulti-

mate price each hospital paid for a product depended upon the
volume purchased by all the hospitals. 42 Since the agreement
neither required VHA hospitals to buy any AHSC product nor
obligated AHSC to sell the hospitals any specific product at a
specified price, the agreement was implemented through a course
43
of dealing between VHA hospitals and AHSC.
VHA and AHSC personnel together presented the agreement
to the VHA hospitals. 44 In addition, the VHA and AHSC cooperated to inhibit competitive bidding on hospital supplies at
individual VHA hospitals. 4 5 The VHA attempted to persuade

member hospitals to disclose competitors' prices so that AHSC
would have a chance to match those prices.4 6 AHSC established
a matching policy limited by a "walk away privilege" that
allowed AHSC to decline "unprofitable" business.17 Once having offered to match a competitor's price, AHSC attempted to
preclude such sellers from rebidding on the business. 48
The plaintiffs, White & White Surgical Supply and Pharmacies, Inc.,49 Bluefield Supply Co., Crocker-Fels Co., and Ransdell
Surgical, Inc., regional distributors of medical, surgical and
other supplies, competed with AHSC for distributor business in
eight VHA hospitals. 5 The plaintiffs claimed that by executing
and implementing the purchasing agreement, AHSC, the VHA,
and individual VHA hospitals had conspired to violate the antitrust laws. 51 The plaintiffs' suit alleged that AHSC had violated

41. Id. at 972-74.
42. Id. at 972-73.
43. Id. at 974.
44. Id. at 974-75.
45. Id. at 975. VHA's Robert Kitzman took notes during a planning meeting which
contained statements that AHSC should be viewed as a "vendor of choice and that competitor bids should not be accepted." Id.
46. Id. As a result, many VHA hospitals accepted AHSC's matched price without
giving the competitor an opportunity to rebid.
47. Through the "walk-away privilege" AHSC could turn down business it considered
unprofitable, "which the VHA could obtain at an extremely low price from its usual
vendor." Id. at 976.
48. Id. at 1008.
49. White & White Surgical Supply and Pharmacies, Inc. is located in Grand Rapids,
Michigan. White & White distributes from two Michigan warehouses to a maximum sales
area which includes the lower peninsula of Michigan, northwest Ohio, and northeast
Indiana. 1980 corporate sales were $18 million. Id. at 962.
50. Id. at 960.
51. Id.
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sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton
Act, and specifically charged AHSC with attempting to monopolize, price fixing, tying, exclusive dealing and group boycott,
and price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act. 52 The
price fixing, tying, and price discrimination charges were later
dropped, but the plaintiffs were allowed to amend their complaint to add a count of conspiracy between AHSC, the VHA,
and the individual VHA hospitals to restrain trade. 53 The plain54
tiffs sought treble damages and injunctive relief.
The White & White court found that the AHSC-VHA agreement and its implementation violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act, in that AHSC had entered into a conspiracy in restraint of
trade, 55 as well as section 2 of the Act, because AHSC had
attempted to monopolize the sale of medical-surgical supplies in
certain standard metropolitan statistical areas. 56 The court concluded, however, that AHSC had not violated section 3 of the
Clayton Act since it had not established an exclusive dealing
relationship at any VHA hospital, 57 nor was there sufficient
evidence to hold AHSC guilty of conspiring to induce a group
58
boycott of its competitors.
The Attempt to Monopolize in
Violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act
In analyzing the section 2 allegation, the court focused on the
two elements underlying an attempt to monopolize claim: proof

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 960.
Id. at 1026.

56.

Id. at 1013.

57. Id. at 1030. Since the terms of the AHSC-VHA agreement did not expressly require
the VHA hospitals to purchase exclusively from AHSC or prohibit the hospitals from
dealing with other suppliers, the plaintiffs had claimed that the terms and implementation of the agreement amounted to an implied exclusive dealing arrangement. The court
found that, although the evidence established that both AHSC and the VHA had
intended to build an exclusive dealing relationship between AHSC and each of the
member hospitals, the evidence did not support a finding that such an agreement had in
fact been established at any VHA hospital.
58. Id. at 1036. As the AHSC-VHA agreement did not expressly require the VHA
hospitals to refuse to deal with vendors other than AHSC, the court looked to the implementation of the agreement to infer an agreement to boycott AHSC's competitors. The
court found that, since significant medical-surgical business was still awarded to the
plaintiffs and other vendors, the VHA hospitals had not entered into an agreement with
AHSC to boycott the plaintiffs. Id. at 1035.
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of specific intent to monopolize, and proof that there was a dangerous probability of success. 59 Specific intent could be inferred
"from circumstantial evidence such as defendant's past anticompetitive conduct, statements or business policies," but could
not be inferred from activities which were conducted for legitimate business reasons. 60 Proof of the dangerous probability
element did not require that the defendant possess the market
power necessary for an actual monopoly. Instead, it was necessary only to show the "dangerous probability" that the defendant could establish a monopoly, measured by the defendant's
market power in a defined market. 61 The court defined the relevant product market as a three dimensional submarket involving (1) the sale of medical-surgical supplies (2) to hospitals (3) by
distributors.62 The relevant geographic market was also defined
in terms of submarkets, namely, the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) of eight cities. 63
Intent
The White & White court found the terms and the implementation of the purchasing agreement to be anticompetitive acts
which were "collectively sufficient" to establish AHSC's specific
intent to monopolize.6 4 The terms of the agreement were anticompetitive in three respects. First, the product and geographic
markets covered were too broad. 65 Because AHSC's competitors
were smaller and specialized in narrower product and geographic submarkets, they could not provide such a wide range of
products or distribute to as many geographic markets. Thus,
AHSC's competitors would be foreclosed from competing.
Second, under the price cap and volume discount terms of the
agreement, VHA hospitals could purchase "medical/surgical,
laboratory, dietary, laundry, housekeeping, parenteral therapy,
surgical instruments and supplies, equipment and furnishings"

59. Id. at 1000.
60. Id. at 1001.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 982.
63. Id. at 993. The eight cities were Grand Rapids, Detroit, Charleston (W.Va.), Cincinnati, Columbus, Dayton, Indianapolis, and Louisville.
64. Id. at 1002.
65. Id. The court noted that a purchasing agreement with such a "broad product and
geographic coverage [was] unprecedented in the hospital supply industry." Id. at 1002-03.
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from AHSC.66 The court found that linking such a wide range of
products under these provisions created a leverage effect among
independent product submarkets, 67 since VHA hospitals purchased not only preferred but also unpreferred AHSC products in
6
order to qualify for the price caps and volume discounts. 1 Competitors of AHSC were unable to offer the VHA hospitals a similar interproduct price cap or volume discount. In order to compete at the VHA hospitals, therefore, these distributors would
have to offer not only price concessions on their particular product, but additional price concessions to compensate the hospital
for foregoing "blanket incentives available on other AHSC
69
products."
Finally, under the price cap and volume discount provisions,
VHA hospitals purchased AHSC products without knowing their
net prices.7 0 Because the price cap and volume discount depended
upon the purchases of all VHA hospitals, no individual VHA
hospital could determine the ultimate price of any AHSC product
at the time of sale. The hospital could not compare AHSC's net
price with that of a competitor's and as a result, the court found,
7
price competition was injured. '
Implementation of the agreement likewise stifled price competition. 72 The court found that AHSC and the VHA had created a
unique buyer-seller relationship akin to a partnership. 73 AHSC
and VHA personnel worked together to induce VHA member
hospitals to support the agreement. 74 Moreover, AHSC expected
individual hospitals to pressure each other into increasing their
purchases so that the group would qualify for price reduc-

66. Id. at 1003.
67. Id.
68.

Id. at 1004.

69. Id. at 1006.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1007.
73. Id. at 1018. The court stated that: "Prior to the AHSC/VHA Agreement equal
opportunity for distributors to compete for sales opportunities has been the norm in the
medical-surgical supply distribution industry . . . [Bly agreement, AHSC, the VHA and
irrdividual VHA hospitals seek to create a unique seller-buyer partnership which destroys
traditional competition at VHA hospitals." Id.
74. Id. at 975. The court noted that this "partnership theory of business" was present
in other VHA contracts with other suppliers. General Electric and Standard Register
Company were cited as examples. Id.
Based on the White & White decision, one of VHA's former suppliers sued VHA and
Standard Register Co. for restraint of trade, group dealing, and exclusive dealing in vio-
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tions.7 5 The court considered AHSC's "match-it" program, "walkaway" privilege, and peer pressure techniques to be strategies
aimed at destroying price competition at VHA hospitals.7 6 Their
combined result was to keep AHSC's competitors from obtaining
77
business from individual VHA hospitals.
Dangerous Probability of Success
As noted above, dangerous probability of success requires a
showing that the party charged with attempting to monopolize
has market power sufficient to effect a monopoly. 78 The White &
White court assessed the dangerous probability of success in
each of the eight SMSA geographic markets already established
by examining AHSC's market share in each submarket. The
court noted that AHSC's market share exceeded twenty-seven
percent in five SMSAs but cautioned that this figure standing
alone was meaningless. Such a percentage needed to be evaluated against the market structure and the trend of AHSC's
market shares. 79 Lacking data on the trend of AHSC's market
shares, the court simply stated that the evidence showed a substantial increase in AHSC's sales in all eight SMSAs from 1979
to 1980.80 The character and objectives of AHSC's anticompetitive conduct were then measured in relation to the structure of
the medical-surgical supply distribution market.8 1 The court
considered "the serious anticompetitive character and objectives
of [AHSC's] conduct, the fragility of [AHSC's] competitors, and
[AHSC's] ever increasing dominance in the relevant metropolitan submarkets" and found that where AHSC's metropolitan
market share exceeded twenty-five percent, a dangerous probability of success of monopoly existed.8 2 The court concluded that
AHSC's anticompetitive conduct, with the specific intent to
monopolize, posed a dangerous probability of success in five

lation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Langston Corp. v. Standard Register Co., 553 F.
Supp. 632 (N.D. Ga. 1982). See Kuntz, Antitrust Ruling Against VHA Contract Spurs
Supplier to File Another Challenge, 12 MODERN HEALTHCARE 46 (Aug. 1982).
75. 540 F. Supp. at 975.
76. Id. at 1009.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1001.
79. Id. at 1010.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1010-13.
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metropolitan areas, and that AHSC had therefore attempted to
monopolize these five submarkets in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. 8:1
The Conspiracy to Restrain Trade in
Violation of Section I of the Sherman Act
The White & White court presented a two-step analysis for
determining whether a contract or conspiracy unreasonably restrains trade. First, the court determines whether a conspiracy
exists which restrains trade in a relevant, defined market;8 4 next,
it determines whether the restraint is reasonable . 5 Restraint is
considered reasonable if it promotes, rather than suppresses,
86
competition.
The White & White court inferred an antitrust conspiracy from
three factors. The first, joint participation in an unlawful scheme,
was evinced by the agreement itself to which AHSC, the VHA,
and the individual VHA hospitals, as third party beneficiaries,
were parties.8 7 All the parties worked together to introduce the
agreement to the hospitals and to carry out its goals. In fact, a
close-knit relationship developed between AHSC, the VHA, and

82. Id. at 1013.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1014.
85. Id. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits every contract, combination, or conspiracy that retrains trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Originally, this language was read literally.
See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). Since every contract restrains trade to some degree, courts have interpreted § 1 under a rule of reason
analysis. The rule of reason began to emerge in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), where Judge Taft read "unreasonable" into the language of
the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court adopted the rule of reason in Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911), where the Court applied a "standard of reason" to the
Sherman Act. The "standard" was reaffirmed in United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
221 U.S. 106, 180 (1911). Justice Brandeis provided the classic definition of the rule of
reason in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918): "The true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."
Id. at 238.
For further discussion of the rule of reason, see J. VON KALINOWSKI, 16A BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS,

ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 6.02, at 6-55 (rev. ed. 1982);

Bohling, A Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints: Integrating Social Goals,
Economic Analysis and Sylvania, 64 IOWA L. REv. 461, 502 (1979); Bork, The Rule of
Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 781
(1965); Sullivan, supra note 18, at 322. Note, Sylvania and Beyond: An Expanding Rule
of Reason for DistributionalRestraints, 4 J. CORP. L. 169 (1978).
86. 540 F. Supp. at 1014.
87. Id. at 1015.
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its member hospitals.8 8 The second factor, knowledge by each
party of the others' involvement, was readily apparent.8 9 The
final element, joint action to further an unlawful common design,
was found in the execution and implementation of the agreement
which caused the VHA hospitals to abandon competitive bidding. 90 Having found the three essential elements of a conspiracy, the court concluded that AHSC, along with the VHA and
individual VHA hospitals, had entered into a conspiracy to restrain trade. 9'

The court next considered whether the restraint was reasonable. AHSC offered two reasons for its trade practices with the
VHA and the VHA hospitals. First, AHSC claimed that the purchase agreement had forced its competitors to be more competitive and, second, AHSC urged that the agreement was reasonable as a new approach to hospital cost containment. 92 The
court found AHSC's first argument totally without merit and
rejected its second argument on the ground that the VHA hospitals were apparently paying more for their supplies from AHSC
than from their former vendors. 93 Thus, the court concluded that
AHSC, the VHA, and the individual VHA hospitals had formed
a conspiracy to restrain trade unreasonably in seven of the eight
94
relevant submarkets.
The Leverage Theory
The White & White plaintiffs had originally alleged that the
purchasing agreement, as implemented, was a tying arrange-

88. Id.
89. Id. at 1016.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1024.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1026. The court awarded the plaintiffs $143,546 in damages, which were
then trebled under § 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)) for a
total of $430,638. Id. at 1045. AHSC was permanently enjoined from acting to further the
AHSC-VHA purchasing agreement for the sale and distribution of medical-surgical supplies in seven of the eight SMSAs which comprised the relevant submarkets. Id. AHSC
was specifically prohibited from (1) offering or paying price caps or volume discounts
under the AHSC-VHA purchasing agreement with respect to the sale of medical-surgical
supplies in the seven submarkets, (2) inducing VHA hospitals to disclose competitors'
prices for medical surgical supplies or "otherwise appropriating" business for matching
prices in any of the seven submarkets, and (3) inducing VHA hospitals to suppress or
discourage competitive bidding for the sale of medical-surgical supplies at any VHA hospital located in one of the seven submarkets. Id.
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ment which violated section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3
of the Clayton Act.9 5 A tying or tie-in arrangement forces a
buyer to take a product he does not want, the "tied" product, in
96
order to obtain the product he does want, the "tying" product.
Tying arrangements are strictly construed by the courts and are
usually held to be per se violations 97 under both the Clayton Act
and the Sherman Act.98 This is because the recognized purpose

95. Id. at 1004.
96. In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court stated "a tying
arrangement may be defined as an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on
the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees
that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier." Id. at 5-6.
For a further explanation of tying, see generally Bauer, A Simplified Approach to
Tying Arrangements:A Legal and Economic Analysis, 33 VAND. L. REV. 283 (1980); Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 62 (1960); Posner, Exclusionary
Practices and the Antitrust Laws, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 506 (1974); Turner, The Validity of
Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REv. 50 (1958); Note, Antitrust Per Se Doctrine - Tying Arrangements and the Market Power Requirement, 8
TULSA L.J. 235 (1972).
97. Some activities are considered so "inherently unlawful" that they are judged by a
per se rule. Tying arrangements, group boycotts, and price fixing are activities which are
considered per se violations of the antitrust laws. The per se rule was first announced in a
price fixing case, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). There the
court stated: "Agreements which create such potential [monopoly] power may well be
held to be in themselves unreasonable or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of
minute inquiry whether a particular price is reasonable or unreasonable ..
" Id. at 397.
The rule was reaffirmed in another price fixing case, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, reh'g denied, 310 U.S. 658 (1940), where the Court stated: "Under the
Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se." Id. at 223. The rule has since been applied to tying
arrangements, International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, appeal dismissed,
332 U.S. 747 (1947), to group boycotts, Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207 (1959), and to division of markets agreements, United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc.,
405 U.S. 596 (1972). In a recent decision, Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 102 S.
Ct. 2466 (1982), the Court applied the per se rule to find an agreement among competing
physicians setting the maximum fees paid by participants of certain insurance plans to
be illegal per se under § 1 of the Sherman Act. See also Halper, Arizona v. Maricopa
County, A Stern Warning to HealthcareProviders, HEALTHCARE FIN. MANAGEMENT, Oct.
1982, at 38.
For more information on the per se rule, see 16A J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 85,
§ 6.02[1], at 6-57; Bohling, supra note 85, at 490; Bork, supra note 85, at 820; Brace &
Nissen, Antitrust: Recent Developments in the Per Se Doctrine, 61 CHI. B. R c. 49 (1979);
Conant, The Antitrust Per Se Rules: JudicialDecisionmaking Under 'Bounded Rationality,' 12 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. RE-V. 49 (1980).
98. 16B J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 85, § 11.03, at 11-18 to 11-19. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 394-96 (1947) (leases for two patented salt
processing machines contained tying clauses requiring purchase of unpatented salt and
salt tablets consumed by the leased machines violated § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of
the Clayton Act).

19831

Hospital Shared Purchasing Agreements

of a tying arrangement is the suppression of competition.9 9 Buyers are denied a free choice between competing products, and
competitors are denied free access to the market for the tied product.10 0 Power or leverage in the tying product market is exerted
to restrain trade in the tied product market.1°1
Although the tying claim in White & White was dismissed,10 2
the AHSC-VHA purchasing agreement, as implemented, was
ultimately found to violate section 2 of the Sherman Act under
the same type of leverage theory that courts employ in tying cases."' :'
The White & White leverage theory, however, does not require
that products be "tied" together. Instead, the leverage exists
between separate product categories that are linked together, but
not tied together. By linking unrelated product categories together
under the price cap and volume discount provisions of the agreement, AHSC levered the purchase of unpreferred AHSC products
against the purchase of preferred AHSC products. 10 4 Without
deeming this interproduct linkage a tying arrangement, the
court nonetheless found the linkage anticompetitive.10 5
Other courts have held similar linkage schemes to be anticompetitive. In SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,10 6 a district court
in Pennsylvania found Lilly guilty of violating section 2 of the
Sherman Act by creating and implementing a unique marketing
scheme which linked two products on which Lilly faced no competition with a competitive product.10 7 The result of the scheme
was that all three products were sold on a noncompetitive basis
in what otherwise would have been a competitive market.10 8

The standards of proof of a tying arrangement under § 1 and § 3 are not identical, but
they involve the same general elements: (1) proof of a tying relationship between a
defined tying product and a tied product, (2) proof that the defendant exerts "economic
power" over the tying product, and (3) proof that a "not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce" is foreclosed from competition. 16B J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 85, at
11-18 to 11-9; 16A J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 85, § 6G.05[2], at 6G-81 to 6G-100.
99. Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969).
100. Id. at 498-99 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958)).
101. Id.
102. 540 F. Supp. at 1004.
103. See generally Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67
YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Markovits, Tie-Ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76 YALE
L.J. 1397 (1967).
104. 540 F. Supp. at 1004.
105. Id. at 1005.
106. 427 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838 (1978).
107. Id. at 1121.
108. Id.
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The SmithKline plaintiffs, like the White & White plaintiffs,
had originally alleged that the defendant's marketing plan was
a tying arrangement. 10 9 While the district court in SmithKline
rejected this allegation, it did state that Lilly's plan was likely to
have the same effect as a tying arrangement. 110 By using the
monopoly power it held in the noncompetitive drug market as a
lever in its packaging scheme, Lilly would be able to extend its
monopoly power into the previously competitive drug market.11 1
Although the defendants in White & White and SmithKline
avoided the per se liability associated with an illegal tie-in, both
defendants were found guilty of attempted monopolization under
section 2 of the Sherman Act because their linkage schemes
created an anticompetitive leverage effect. Both courts relied on
United States v. Griffith' 12 as authority for their leverage theories.
In Griffith, suit was brought under sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act against four affiliated corporations which operated
movie theaters in a three state area.1 13 The exhibitors had entered
into agreements with distributors whereby towns in which the
exhibitors faced no competition were grouped with towns in
which there were competing theaters. 1 4 The exhibitors had thus
been able to use the buying power of the entire area to gain
exclusive privileges over competing theaters. 1 5 The Supreme
Court found that by linking the buying power of the noncompetitive towns with that of the competitive towns, the exhibitors had
used their market power as leverage to obtain privileges which
6
their competitors were denied.' 1
The similarities of the defendants' anticompetitive acts in
SmithKline, Griffith, and White & White are evident. In each
case, the defendants attempted to use the monopoly power they
possessed in one market to create a monopoly in a second
market, and in each case the court clearly held that such activity
was illegal. In addition, White & White and SmithKline demonstrate that plaintiffs who fail to prove the elements of a tie-in can
still recover under a leverage analysis.

109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1121.

112.

334 U.S. 100 (1948).

113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 1128.
at
at
at
at

101-02.
102-03.
103-04.
109.
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AHSC has appealed the White & White decision seeking a
redefinition of the relevant markets. 117 AHSC hopes the Sixth
Circuit will broaden the district court's relevant market definitions so as to diminish AHSC's market shares. Assuming the
relevant markets were correctly defined and AHSC does indeed
hold monopoly power, the Sixth Circuit should have little difficulty accepting the White & White leverage theory. In fact, the
Sixth Circuit has already demonstrated that it would apply a
rule of reason analysis in situations where a tie-in per se could
not be proven.
In Ware v. Trailer Mart, Inc.,""8 for example, a mobile home
owner sued a mobile home park claiming that the park was
engaged in anticompetitive behavior by tying the purchase of
mobile homes to leases for rental spaces at the park. 119 The district court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiff had
failed to allege an essential element of a tying offense, that the
defendant possessed "appreciable economic power" in the market
for the tying product, the rental space. 120 The Sixth Circuit
found that the allegation had been made, but more importantly,
the court stated that proof of "appreciable economic power" was
unnecessary if the plaintiff did not intend to prove a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 21 Since Ware did not
intend to prove a per se violation, the court agreed to proceed
under a rule of reason analysis. 2 2 Precedent thus exists for the
Sixth Circuit to apply the rule of reason to the anticompetitive
leveraging found in White & White.

117. Thomas Dumit, deputy general counsel for AHSC, has stated that AHSC will
ask the Sixth Circuit to redefine the relevant product market to include all hospital supplies, rather than just medical-surgical supplies. See Kuntz, AHSC Antitrust Decision
May Curb Group Buying, 12 MODERN HEALTHCARE 18 (June 1982).
For further information on the relevant market concept, see generally MacLeod, The
Relevant Product Market After Brown Shoe: A Framework of Analysis for Clayton and
Sherman Act Cases, 12 Loy. U. CHIi.L.J. 321 (1981); Comment, The Relevant Market
Concept in Conspiracy to Monopolize Cases Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 44 U.
CiI. L. & v. 805 (1977).
118. 623 F.2d l150(6th Cir. 1980).
119. Id. at 1152.
120. Id. at 1153.
121. Id. In coming to this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit relied on Fortner Enters. v.
United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969). In that case, the Supreme Court confronted
a traditional tying arrangement whereby credit was sold only on the condition that the
plaintiff also purchased prefabricated houses. Id. at 498. The trial court relied on the
standards set forth in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), and held that
the defendants lacked "sufficient economic power" over the tying product, credit. 394 U.S.
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Guidelines
Although White & White is pending appeal in the Sixth Circuit, the district court opinion does highlight certain pitfalls
which hospitals should avoid when entering into shared purchasing agreements. For example, contracts covering broad product and geographic categories should be avoided. There should
be no linking of unrelated hospital supply products through single price cap and volume discount terms. Rather, price caps and
volume discounts should be limited to a single, broad product
category, such as medical-surgical supplies or parenteral products. Each hospital subscribing to the agreement should be able
to calculate at the time of purchase the net price of each product
covered under the agreement. Price caps and volume discounts
should be based on each hospital's purchases rather than on
aggregate hospital purchases. Most importantly, the agreement
should avoid any hint of leveraging or tying and should stimulate competition, rather than suppress it.
Shared purchasing agreements are a useful cost containment
method and can be written and implemented without violating
the antitrust laws. To illustrate, on June 10, 1982, the Justice
Department issued a business review letter informing the Ohio
Hospital Purchasing Consortium (OHPC) 123 that OHPC's proposed
group purchasing program would not be challenged under the
antitrust laws. 12 4 Under the OHPC plan, OHPC would select a
number of products, excluding services, for statewide group purchasing. Once estimates of needed supplies were received from
the local purchasing groups, OHPC would tabulate the orders
and solicit bids from a number of suppliers. OHPC would then
recommend successful vendors and contracts would be sent to
local purchasing group members or individual hospitals. No

at 503. The court also held that the amount of interstate commerce affected was "insubstantial." Id. Noting this, the Supreme Court stated that these standards were:
necessary only to bring into play the doctrine of per se illegality .... A plaintiff
can still prevail on the merits whenever he can prove, on the basis of a more
thorough examination of the purposes and effects of the practices involved, that
the general standards of the Sherman Act have been violated.
Id. at 499-500.
122. 623 F.2d at 1154.
123. OHPC is comprised of eight local groups which represent 160 of Ohio's 204 notfor-profit hospitals.
124. U.S. Dep't of Justice Business Review Letter from William F. Baxter to B.
William Dunlop (June 9, 1982).
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party would be committed to purchasing any product(s) offered
through OHPC until the contract was executed.
The Justice Department found it significant that no purchasing group or participating hospital would be required to purchase
any of its requirements for any product through OHPC, nor was
any member or hospital precluded from dealing with any particular supplier. 125 The Justice Department believed the proposal
would result in further cost containment for hospitals and saw
no likelihood that OHPC's joint purchasing program would re6
strain trade in any particular product market. 21
The differences between the OHPC plan and the AHSC-VHA
program are striking. OHPC would solicit bids from many suppliers, individual contracts would be written, and no group member
would be required to participate in the purchasing plan. Unlike
the AHSC-VHA program, OHPC's plan would encourage competition, not restrain it.
CONCLUSION

Shared purchasing agreements are a useful cost containment
method for hospitals and other health care providers. In order to
avoid any conflict with the antitrust laws, shared purchasing
agreements should be written with the White & White guidelines
in mind. Anticompetitive leveraging through product linking or
product tying should be avoided at all costs. The group purchasing plan proposed by OHPC illustrates that shared purchasing
agreements can be drafted so as to contain rising health care
costs without provoking antitrust challenges.
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125.
126.

Id. at 2.
Id.

